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CORPORATIONS: LIABILITIES INCIDENT TO TRANSFER OR ISSUE
OF STOCK AS COLLATERAL.
G became a stockholder in corporation

X but did not pay for his stock. X was indebted to A and W and
it was agreed that G's stock should be delivered to A and W as
collateral for the pre-existing debt. This was accomplished by a
surrender of G's certificate to X and the issue of new certificates to
A and W. Subsequently, with the consent of A and W, G made a
written assignment to S of all his interest in the stock, subject to
the pledge to A and W. X becoming insolvent, the question is
whether S is liable for the unpaid balance on the stock, to collect
which a creditor's bill is filed against him. It should seem that G
ceased to be a stockholder when the new certificates were issued to
A and W. Did A and W become stockholders in virtue of such
issue? It is clear that all parties intended G to retain an equitable
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interest in the shares, which equitable interest he afterwards assigned to S. If G had transferred his stock direct to A and W
they would have became stockholders and, as such, liable for the
unpaid balance. As the transfer would have been in such case
subject to a trust, it should seem that G also would have remained
liable. No liability could have been incurred by S. Is the result
affected by the circumstance that G surrendered his certificate and
caused new certificates to be issued to A and W? Clearly the
result, as to S, is the same. By such a surrender G could not
escape liability to creditors but the assignment of his equity to S
could not impose liability upon the latter. Such is the result
reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in
Sturtevant v. National Foundry and Pie U/orles, 88 Fed. 613
(July 26, 1898). The court, however, complicates the decision
by announcing what are conceived to be certain untenable propositions. After citing the provision of the Wisconsin Statutes
(§ 1753) which makes void all issues of stock for which no
payment of money or property is made at the date of the issue,
the court declares that the certificate originally issued to G was
void-but concedes that he became and remained liable to creditors
for the par value of the stock. This is obviously a concession that
he became a stockholder notwithstanding the statutory prohibition.
The court then declares that the certificates issued to A and W
were likewise void but holds that A and W did not become stockholders inasmuch as the stock was issued to them merely as
collateral. This view is based, in part, upon the unsound theory
once announced by the Court of Appeals of New York in Christensen
v. Eno, io6 N. Y. 97 (885),
that the liability of a stockholder is
purely contractual as distinguished from being a liability incident
to status. The doctrine of Christensen v. Eno has been repudiated
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Handey v. Stu/z, 139
U. S. 417 (x89o).
Nevertheless we find the doctrine cited approvingly by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the present case (just
as it had been similarly cited in Andrews v.
rationalFoundry and
Pipe Works, 76 Fed. 166 (1896)), and we find the court further
seeking to support its conclusion that A and W did not become
stockholders by citing Burgess v. Selignan, 107 U. S. 20 (1882).
In that case, however, the decision that the registered holder of
stock as collateral did not become liable to creditors was based upon
a local statute ; whereas here the court has no such statute to rely
upon. Clearly A and W became stockholders when the certificates
were issued to them. Any other conclusion is in conflict with
fundamental principle. The statutory provision should be regarded
as depriving the holder of watered stock of the privileges
of a stockholder but it cannot be treated as exempting him
from liability. Equally clear is it that S incurred no liability
to creditors, for he never became a stockholder nor did he
assume the liability by contract. The court should have protected
him upon these grounds instead of wrongly deciding that A and W

NOTES.

had never become liable and then proceeding to treat S as a successor to their immunity. In point of law there was no privity
between S on the one hand and A and W on the other. S derived
his rights by assignment from G but he never succeeded to his
liability.
G. 1 P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ;
ACTS; "
CORPORATIONS.

FREEDOM

OF

CONTRACT ;

" TRUCK

The Kansas Court of Appeals has
sustained the constitutionality of an act, applying in its terms only
to corporations or trusts employing ten or more persons, which
forbids payment of wages except by lawful money of the United
States or by check or draft upon active account: Hann v. State,
54 Pac. 130.
The validity of the statute was attacked for want of uniformity,
for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for repugnance to
the State Bill of Rights, providing that "all men are possessed of
equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness."
The court says: "We believe no
case has been pointed out where such an enactment has been
unqualifiedly declared to be a valid exercise of the police powers of
the state in respect to natural persons," and proceed to sustain the
act solely on the reserved right of the state to amend charters of
corporations. These artificial persons, the court points out, except
for the powers granted them by the legislature, could make no
contracts whatever. Surely, then, it is competent for the state to
specify what kinds of contracts they may make. Laws to prevent
the withholding of wages or the imposition of a fine by the employer
for imperfect work, laws providing for payment of employes at
specified times, "Screen Acts," laws prescribing notices of discharge, and these "Truck" or ' Scrip " or " Company-store"
Acts, all fall in much the same category. All constitute a technical
violation of the freedom of contract, as applied to the individual,
at least, and in case of all the same difficulty is found of formulating
a uniform rule of application. The distinction made by the Kansas
court, between corporations and individuals, as to the liability of
their contracts to state interference, is not in accord with the
majority of decisions. San Antonio & A. P. R. v. Wilson, i9
S. W. (Tex.) 910 (1892), declared unconstitutional, for want of
uniformity, a statute prescribing the time of payment of railway
employes, although the Texas Constitution has no provision against
class legislation. Braceville C'oal Co. v. People, 35 N. E. (Ill.)
62 (1893), pronounced invalid a similar law applying to all corporations for profit. The decision was based on a provision of the
Illinois Constitution (sec. 2, art. 2), which follows the Fourteenth
Amendment, to -the effect that " no person can be deprived of life
liberty or property, except by due process of law."
The court
observes "the restriction of the right to contract, affects not only
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the corporation, and restricts its right to contract, but that of the
employe as well."
The result reached by the court was founded
partly, however, on a provision of the Illinois Constitution forbidding the. amendment of corporate charters by special laws.
Godcharles v. [Vikeman, 113 Pa. 437 (x886), and Showalter v,
Ellan, 5 Pa. (Super.) 242, 248 (897), sweepingly condemn all
such legislation as "an insulting attempt to put the laborer under
legislative tutelige," violating his inalienable right as an AngloSaxon to contract to be paid in company-store orders, if upon one
consideration, he considers it to his interest so to do. The court
did not discuss the question of the economic compulsion which
circumstances place on the laborer, more effectually destroying his
boasted " Anglo-Saxon" freedom of contract than even this proposed
"Socialistic" legislation could do. Iheeling Bridge &
. R. Co.
v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio C. C. 658 (894),
says, "The liberty of
making contracts is absolutely essential to the acquisition, possession and enjoyment of property; " "the police power of the state
extends to matters only affecting the public welfare [sic], the
health, safety, and morals of the people" and "beyond this [i. e,,
the police power] the state cannot interfere with the dealings and
contracts of such companies with the employes who are stijuris,
any farther than it lawfully can with those of other employers of
labor."
Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366 (x889), sustained a
statute requiring 'miners to be paid only in lawful money. No
attempt was made to distinguish corporations from natural persons,
in applying the act, In Stale v, Loomis, 22 S. W. (Mo.) 350
(1893), the act in question forbade manufacturing and mining
corporations to issue any wage orders payable otherwise than in
lawful money. The court held the law unconstitutional. Barclay,
J., dissented, however, on similar grounds to those given by Mr.
Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Comm. v. Pery, 155 Mass. 117
(1891).
These learned justices both would justify such legislation
on the "police power" of the state to provide against fraud. The
legislature has a right to interfere in behalf of a weak or ignorant
class, and to deprive certain classes of employers of a contract right
which they are using in the opinion of the legislature, for a dishonest purpose. This applies both to corporations and natural
persons. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts seems to have come
around to Mr. Justice Holmes's views: Opinions of Juslices, 163
Mass. 589 (1895).
On the other hand, in Rhode Island, a weekly payment law applying only to employes of corporations was upheld in Stale v. Brown
CO., 25 Atd. (R. I.) 246 (1892), on the same grounds as those
stated in the principal case. Leep v. R., 25 S.W. (Ark.) 75
(1894), sustained a weekly payment act as to corporations, but
held invalid as regards natural persons.
In Slate v. Goodwill,
33 W. Va. i79 (i8gi), a "Scrip Act," applying only to mining
and manufacturing corporations was declared void as class legisla"tion. Another act, however, applying to all corporations "engaged
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in any trade or business " was sustained in State v. Coal Co.,
36 W. Va. 802 (1892), partly because corporations are
creatures of the state receiving extraordinary powers and hence
subject to extraordinary restrictions, and partly because -"the
public tranquility and the good and safety of society demand,
where the number of employes is such that specific contracts with
each laborer would be improbable if not impossible, that in general
contracts justice shall prevail as between operator and miner" and
...
" that all opportunities for fraud shall be removed " And
further, " once concede that the coal industry is a proper subject
for the exercise of police regulation, and it follows, by all the
authorities, that the legislature and not the courts, is to judge of
the propriety and reasonableness of any given regulation . . .,"
One judge expresses his opinion that the act would apply constitutionally to natural persons as well, but, of course, the case determines no more than the validity of the act as it stands. See, also,
AlcAf nich v. 2., 20 Ia. 343 (1866); R. v. Haley, 25 Kans. 35
(i881) ; Shaffer v. Milning CO., 55 Md. 74 (1874), which upheld
similar acts.
The first tendency of the courts to pronounce unconstitutional,
all legislation restricting the freedom of contract, seems now to be
changing, much to the horror of those who live in dread of state
socialism, "the coming slavery."
In this connection the English "Truck Act" is of interest: (I & 2
William IV., cap 37, 22 St. at Large, 484, 490). This act inflicts
penalties in a number of specified trades, on any settlement of wages
by way of barter. Of course, no distinction between natural and
corporate persons is made in England. Written guaranties of
natural rights do not there fetter the legislature. See Mr. W
Stanley fevons's "The State in Relation to Labour," p. io, el. seq.
Parliament in passing an act does not bother about abstract metaphysical rights. It simply inquires whether the wrong is so great
as to make the remedy worth while. On the general question, see
Stinson's " Handbook to the Labor Laws of the U. S.," Chap. II.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES; SURETY'S
IMPLIED.
DeCanip v. Bullard et al

LIABILITY,

EXPRESS AND

(Supreme Ct. N. Y., Jan.,
1898; 50 N. Y. Suppl. 807), was an action on an undertaking
executed by the defendants as sureties. J. Dix and E. Thomson,
Jr., had bought land, under the advice of counsel, that they would
be free to float timber cut thereon down the North Branch of
Moose River and through the plaintiff's premises. They improved
the river and cut down ii,ooo,ooo feet of timber, but an injunction against them was obtained by the plaintiff, which, when finally
affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
left them with 2,000,000 feet of timber up stream with no other
way of bringing it to market, or of utilizing it.
To relieve this hardship the Appellate Division afterwards per-
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mitted them to float down the timber already cut on condition of
their filing an undertaking with two sureties, "to indemnify the
plaintiff against any and all loss or damage whatsoever sustained by
reason of suspending such judgment."
The plaintiff now sues the
sureties, not for any positive hurt he received as a result of the lumbering operations, but for the fair value of the use of the stream
during the six weeks it was covered with logs. Although nothing
in the deed, beyond what has been quoted, favored. his.,claim, the
court allowed it, holding that the plhfrtiff sustained, loss to the
amount of the fair value of the use of the stream, within the exact
meaning of the undertaking, which of course must be strictly construed. The very fact that the plaintiff himself could have made
no profit from the stream, and was, therefore, nowise actively
damaged by the Appellate Court's remission of its injunction, was
seized upon as showing that the defendants must have meant to
obligate themselves for what the occupation of the river was reasonably worth, otherwise they would have performed an idle
ceremony because actual loss could hardly occur to the plaintiff's
unimproved premises: Cf. Goodwin v. Bunzl (886), 102 N.Y. 224.
Although this decision, on a first reading, is somewhat startling
and although very few parallel cases are to be found, nobody, viewing it from the plaintiff's standpoint, should fail to recognize the
justice of his demand. His injunction was remitted, not for any
dictate of public policy, but solely because some timber, bought
and felled in ignorance of the law, lay in danger of rotting and
could be turned to account only by floating it over his land to the
saw mill below. Out of consideration for the purchaser's plight,
they were allowed to trespass on his property. His entire ownership of that part of the river was conceded, and there can be no
doubt that it would have been a violation of property rights to
forbid his full recovery against Dix and Thomson: Cf. Phillips v.
Homf/ray (x883), 24 Ch. D. 439, Etc. ; but see Hale on Damages,
P. 357Turning to the legal principles which secured his recovery against
the sureties, we find them equally decisive. Sureties, while bound
only on the strictest interpretation of their contract, may yet come
under a more enlarged obligation than is set down in the terms of
the contract if their intention to do so is clearly manifested therein:
JA/'Eiroi, v. Afulford (1892), 128 N. Y. 303 ; 28 N. E. 502.
"The real purpose of the undertaking, the situation and character
of the property affected and the status in respect to it of the parties
may be considered in determining the defendants' real intention."
Cf. § iii, Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty, and Sedg. Dam.,
§§ 185-6. This intention was intelligible, the court declared, only
on the supposition that the sureties obligated themselves for the
fair rental value of the river, which was assessed at $500.
PACTICE OF MEDICINE; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. A timely question was discussed by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the
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case of State v. MA1-ld, 40 Atl. 753 (Aug. 17, 1898). The defendant was indicted for practicing medicine without authority.
He was a Christian Scientist and maintained an office where he
could be consulted at certain times. He made no use of drugs or
medicines in his treatment of visitors, but pursued the system of the
sect to which he belonged, in which silent prayer and advice as to
the importance of having faith, and "looking on the bright side of
things," are prominent elements. The defendant did not recommend to any one a course of physical treatment. The court held
that the question was whether the acts complained of were included
in the words " practice of medicine " in their ordinary or popular
meaning, since it did not appear from the statute (Gen. Laws R. I.
c. 165) that the legislature intended to give a broader meaning.
The conclusion was that the acts of the defendant did not constitute the practice of medicine. Bosworth, J., speaks of the
defendant as " a person who does not know, or pretend to know,
anything about disease or about the method of ascertaining the
presence or the nature of disease, or about the nature, preparation,
or use of drugs or remedies, and who ne,'er administers them."
In the case of Application of the First Church of Christ Scientist,
6 Pa. Dist. 745 (1897), Pennypacker, J., came to a different conclusion. A number of Christian Scientists sought to obtain a
charter for a church, but the application was refused on the ground
that the organization was attempting not merely to "inculcate a
creed or promulgate a form of worship," but to "establish a prescribed method of practicing the art of healing the diseases of the
body."
The latter purpose was contrary to the policy of the
Commonwealth, as expressed in the Act of March 24, 1877, P. L.
42, which makes it a misdemeanor to announce one's self as a
"practitioner of medicine, surgery, or obstetrics, or to practice
the same," without a diploma from a chartered medical school
duly authorized to confer the degree of doctor of medicine.
In State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158 (1894), it was held that the
practice of Christian Science, although not a practice of medicine
as those terms are usually understood, is a violation of law, because
it is a treatment for physical or moral ailments, which is included
in the practice of medicine, by the express words of the statute.
From the above cases, it is seen how much the decision of future
cases on the subject will depend upon the exact wording of the
statutes in regard to the practice of medicine.

